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Hedge fund managers are compensated via management fees on the assets under management (AUM)
and incentive fees indexed to the high-water mark (HWM). We study the effects of managerial skills
(alpha) and compensation on dynamic leverage choices and the valuation of fees and  investors' payoffs.
Increasing the investment allocation to the alpha-generating strategy typically lowers the fund's risk-adjusted
excess return due to frictions such as price pressure. When the manager is only paid via management
fees, the manager optimally chooses time-invariant leverage to balance the size of allocation to the
alpha-generating strategy against the negative impact of increasing size on the fund's alpha. When
the manager is paid via both management and incentive fees, we show that (i) the high-powered incentive
fees encourage excessive risk taking, while management fees have the opposite effect; (ii) conflicts
of interest between the manager and investors have significant effects on dynamically changing leverage
choices and the valuation of fees and investors' payoffs; (iii) the manager optimally increases leverage
following strong fund performances; (iv) investors' options to  liquidate the fund following sufficiently
poor fund performances substantially curtail managerial risk-taking, provide strong incentives to de-leverage,
and sometimes even give rise to strong precautionary motives to hoard cash (in long positions); and
(v) managerial ownership concentration has incentive alignment effects.
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Hedge funds' management compensation contracts typically feature both management fees
and performance/incentive fees. The management fee is charged periodically as a fraction,
e.g. 2%, of assets under management (AUM). The incentive fee, a key characteristic that
dierentiates hedge funds from mutual funds, is calculated as a fraction, e.g. 20%, of the
fund's prots. The cost base for the prot calculation is the fund's high-water mark (HWM),
which eectively keeps track of the maximum value of the invested capital and critically
depends on the fund manager's dynamic investment strategies. Presumably, incentive fees
are intended to reward talented managers and to align the interests of the manager and
investors more closely than at management fees do. However, incentive fees may also have
unintended consequences because they tend to encourage managerial excessive risk taking
and do not lead to fund value maximizing leverage choices.1
Sophisticated use of leverage is an important feature of hedge funds (Ang, Gorovyy, and
van Inwegen (2010)). Hedge funds may borrow through the repo markets or from their
prime brokers. Hedge funds can also use various implicit leverage, often via options and
other derivatives. Skilled managers, by leveraging on strategies with positive alphas, can
potentially create signicant value for investors. That is, with a limited amount of capital,
leverage can be rewarding for both the skilled manager and the fund's investors. However, the
fund's marginal return may decrease with leverage because increasing investment exposure
to the alpha generating technology potentially lowers alpha for reasons such as negative price
pressure. The manager takes into account the negative impact of leverage on the portfolio's
alpha when choosing dynamic investment strategies.
We develop an analytically tractable framework of leverage and valuation for hedge funds
with the following features: (i) an alpha generating strategy, (ii) the management fee spec-
ied as a fraction of the AUM; (iii) the high-powered incentive fee linked to the HWM,
and (iv) the fund's alpha decreasing with its leverage. The manager dynamically chooses
leverage to maximize the present value (PV) of total managerial rents, the sum of the PV
of both management and incentive fees.
1Private equity funds also charge both management and incentive fees. While the compensation structure
is similar in essence, institutional details such as fees and prots calculations dier signicantly for hedge
funds and private equity funds. Metrick and Yasuda (2010) provide an economic analysis of private equity
funds.
1For both conceptual and quantitative reasons, it is important to incorporate both man-
agement and incentive fees into our analysis. We will show that management and incentive
fees have dierent, and often opposite, implications for managerial risk taking. With man-
agement fees only, the manager eectively behaves in the investors' interest because man-
agement fees make the manager a de facto equity investor in the fund and there is no agency
issue between the manager and investors.2 However, when the manager is paid via both fees,
conicts of interest between the manager and investors arise. The optionality embedded in
incentive fees encourages the manager to lever more than investors would prefer. The closer
the fund's AUM is to its HWM, the more leverage the manager chooses because the incen-
tive fee is closer to being realized (i.e. the embedded call option is deeper in the money).
This standard optionality argument suggests that the PV of incentive fees is increasing and
convex in the AUM.
On the other hand, paying incentive fees lowers the AUM and hence crowds out current
management fees and also potentially reduces future management fees. Thus, there is a
tension between the PV of management fees and the PV of incentive fees. Importantly, the
PV of management fees is increasing but concave in the AUM because (i) management fees
eectively give the manager an \equity-like" stake in the fund, and (ii) equity investors in
the fund are eectively short in a call option (embedded in incentive fees) to the manager.
As a result, management fees encourage the manager to behave prudently and hence reduce
leverage, ceteris paribus.
When the fund's performance improves (i.e. its AUM rises and gets closer to its HWM),
the manager is more likely to collect the incentive fees, and thus behaves in a more risk-
seeking way by increasing leverage. When the fund's performance deteriorates, incentive
fees are out of the money and the manager thus puts more weight on management fees,
which encourages a more prudent investment strategy. The incentive to lower leverage is
stronger if the downside risk is greater. For example, as we show, the manager is even
willing to go long in the risk-free asset to lower the fund's return volatility when facing
serious performance-based liquidation threats from investors.
To study the impact of performance-triggered liquidation risk by investors, we extend
our baseline model to allow investors to liquidate the fund when the fund loses a signicant
2See Wang and Wang (2010) for a similar result in a dierent setting with management fees only.
2fraction (e.g. 50%) of its AUM from its HWM (i.e. eectively its maximum AUM ever
achieved historically). The liquidation/withdrawal option allows investors to better manage
their downside risk exposure. As we noted earlier, the fund manager is now not just long in
the incentive call option but also short in investors' liquidation option. The manager ratio-
nally manages the fund's leverage in order to maximize the PV of total fees. Quantitatively,
we show that liquidation options signicantly reduce managerial risk-taking and sometimes
cause the manager to be too conservative even from the perspective of investors. As a result,
investors' liquidation options signicantly curtail the manager's total rents. Moreover, man-
agement fees become much more important than incentive fees in contributing to managerial
total rents when we allow investors to liquidate the fund based on performance.
In our numerical example, without the liquidation option, the total managerial rents is
about 60 cents for each dollar of the AUM out of which two-thirds of total rents, i.e. 40 cents,
come from incentive fees in PV. However, when investors can liquidate the fund, say after the
manager loses 25% of its AUM from its HWM, the PV of total fees falls about half to 30 cents
for each dollar of the AUM, out of which only one-third of total rents, i.e. 10 cents, are due
to incentive fees in PV. This calculation illustrates the importance of performance-based
liquidation option on managerial rents and the relative weights of incentive and manage-
ment fees in contributing to managerial rents. We also nd that concentrated managerial
ownership helps to align the incentives between the manager and investors.
Our model provides the rst elements of an analytically tractable operational framework
to study the eects of managerial compensation on the fund's dynamic leverage and valuation
for the manager's and investors' stakes. In addition to deriving the manager's dynamic
leverage decisions, we explicitly link the PV of managerial compensation to managerial
talent/alpha. Our model thus provides a valuation toolbox for investors to evaluate their
investments and managerial compensation contracts given investors' beliefs about managerial
skills. Once investors choose their priors about the manager's unlevered alpha and the Sharpe
ratio, we can use our dynamic valuation framework to determine managerial leverage and
also to quantify PVs of various fees and investors' payos.
Related literature. There are only a few theoretical papers studying the hedge fund's val-
uation and leverage decisions. Goetzman, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), henceforth abbreviated
GIR, provides the rst quantitative inter-temporal valuation framework for management and
3incentive fees in the presence of the HWM. Despite the sophisticated HWM dynamics in-
duced by embedded optionality among other features, they derive closed-form solutions for
various value functions for a fund with a constant alpha and Sharpe ratio. GIR focuses solely
on valuation and thus takes AUM dynamics as given without allowing for leverage decisions.
Building on GIR, we introduce investment-dependent alpha-generating technology, derive
time-varying optimal endogenous leverage choice, and study the implied dynamic valuation
due to time-varying incentives to manage leverage and the fund's performance.
Panageas and Westereld (2009) study the manager's investment decisions when the man-
ager receives incentive fees without management fees. They obtain explicit time-invariant
investment strategies for a risk-neutral patient manager.3 In terms of the model setup, our
paper diers from theirs by incorporating management fees and also the assumption that
the alpha for the levered position may not necessarily scale up with the position. We show
that optimal leverage chosen by the manager critically depends on the ratio of the AUM
and the HWM due to the interaction between incentive and management fees. Management
and incentive fees play important but dierent roles on leverage and valuation. In terms of
results, the value of incentive fees in our paper is convex in AUM, while it is concave in their
model with no liquidation boundary.4
Wang and Wang (2010) study leverage management when the manager is compensated
via management fees but not incentive fees. Compensation contracts with only management
fees eectively make the manager a co-investor in the fund whose cash ows are management
fees in proportion to the AUM, and thus eectively behaves in the investors' interest. Unlike
their paper, our paper focuses on the interaction of management and incentive fees and other
frictions such as liquidation boundaries imposed by investors. Dai and Sundaresan (2010)
point out that the hedge fund is short in two important options: investors' redemption option
and funding options (from prime brokers and short-term debt markets). These two short
positions have signicant eects on optimal leverage and risk management policies (e.g. the
use of unencumbered cash). They do not model the eects of incentive fees and the HWM
on leverage and valuation. Like their paper, we also model the investors' liquidation option,
3While their portfolio strategy solution looks similar to the one in the classic portfolio choice problem for
investors with constant relative risk aversion as in Merton (1971), the economic mechanism is dierent as
they point out in their paper.
4Other dierences between the two papers include payouts to investors and the allowance for a lower
liquidation boundary. For more detailed comparisons with Panageas and Westereld (2009), see Section 5.2.
4but in the context of managerial compensation. Additionally, our paper also studies the
importance of managerial ownership on mitigating agency conicts.
There has been much recent and continuing interest in empirical research on hedge funds.
Fung and Hsieh (1997), Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Agarwal and Naik
(2004), and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) among others, study the nonlinear feature
of hedge fund risk and return.5 Lo (2008) provides a detailed treatment of hedge funds for
their potential contribution to systemic risk in the economy.
2 The baseline model
First, we introduce the fund manager's alpha-generating investment opportunity. Second,
we describe the fund's managerial compensation contracts including both management and
incentive fees. Then, we discuss the dynamics for the fund's AUM, and dene various value
functions for the manager and investors. Finally, we state the manager's intertemporal
optimization problem subject to investors' voluntary participation.
The fund's investment technology. The fund has a trading strategy which generates
expected excess returns after risk adjustments. The fund's expected excess returns may
be attributed to managerial talent and may not be traded. In reality, fund managers are
sometimes secretive about their trading strategies and take measures to make replications
of their strategies dicult.
In addition to investing in the risky strategy, the manager can also invest in the risk-
free asset, which oers a constant rate of return r. Let the amount of investment in the
risk-free asset be D. Let W denote the fund's AUM. The amount invested in the risky
alpha-generating technology is then W  D. When D < 0, the fund takes on leverage, often
via short-term debt. Hedge funds can obtain leverage from the fund's prime brokers, repo
markets, and the use of derivatives.6
Let  denote the asset-capital ratio  = (W  D)=W. Given investment strategy t, the
5For the presence of survivorship bias, selection bias, and back-lling bias in hedge funds databases,
see Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992), and Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999), among
others. For careers and survival, see Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001).
6Few hedge funds are able to directly issue long-term debt or secure long-term borrowing.
5incremental return for the underlying alpha-generating strategy dRt is given by
dRt = (t)dt + dBt ; (1)
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion. For expositional simplicity, we assume that the
volatility parameter  is constant for the strategy and focus on the expected return ().7
Even with constant , leverage will change the volatility of the portfolio return for the
standard leverage argument. The expected return () is for the unlevered position and
is interpreted as the expected return after the adjustment for the systematic risk. The
larger the fund's position per unit of capital , the lower the expected excess return on the
marginal unit of investment of the unlevered position. This may be due to the price pressure,
decreasing returns to scale for the fund manager's ability to scale up its alpha-generating
skill/position and/or liquidity issues with the fund's increasingly large position. Motivated
by these considerations, we thus assume that () is decreasing in , i.e. 0() < 0. We
choose this specication to capture price pressure in an analytically tractable framework.8 In
addition, this homogeneity assumption for the price pressure eect ensures that the impact
(i.e. price pressure) always matters and the fund will not grow out of it. Berk and Green
(2004) make a similar price pressure type of assumption in their study of mutual funds
industry equilibrium.
Let () denote the un-levered expected excess return beyond the risk-free rate
() = ()   r: (2)
Alpha measures managerial talent in our model. We have already accounted for the sys-
tematic risk in the return generating process (1). Scarce managerial skills earn rents in
equilibrium. Taking into account the eects of the investment  on alpha, the manager op-
timally chooses . By increasing , the rm earns alpha on a larger amount of total assets,
however, each unit of asset earns a lower level of . The fund optimally trades o between
these two osetting eects in a dynamic optimizing framework as we will show.
Managerial compensation contracts. The typical hedge fund management compensa-
tion contract has two main components: the management fees and the incentive fees. The
7Note that here dRt is for the return of the alpha generating strategy, not for the return of the portfolio
with leverage, which is addressed later.
8In our earlier version, we assumed costly leverage. The mathematical formulation via costly leverage is
similar to the price pressure version captured by () that we adopt in the paper.
6management fee is specied as a constant fraction c of the AUM W: fcWt : t  0g. The
incentive fee links compensation to the fund's performance.
To describe the incentive fees, we need to understand the fund's high-water mark (HWM)
process fHt : t  0g. For the purpose of exposition, rst consider the simplest example where
the HWM Ht is the highest level that the AUM W has attained up to time t, i.e. H is the
running maximum of W: Ht = maxst Ws.
More generally, the HWM may also change due to indexed growth or investors' with-
drawal.9 Let g denote the (normal) rate at which H grows. As in GIR, investors in our
model are paid continuously at a rate Wt where  is a constant. Naturally, the fund's
high-water mark is adjusted downward due to investors' withdrawal at the rate .
Provided that the fund is in operation and the fund's AUM W is below its HWM (W <
H), the evolution of H is locally deterministic and is given by
dHt = (g   )Htdt; when Wt < Ht : (3)
For example, g may be set to zero, the interest rate r, or other benchmark levels. The
growth of H to some extent may account for the time value of money. Whenever the AUM
W exceeds its HWM, the manager collects a fraction k of the fund's performance exceeding
its HWM and then the HWM resets. We provide a detailed analysis for the dynamics of the
HWM H on the boundary W = H in Section 4.
The dynamic of the AUM W. We take the initial AUM W0 as given.10 In our baseline
model and in GIR, investors stochastically liquidate the fund at a constant rate  per unit
of time. This assumption implies that the fund has a nite average duration and also keeps
the model stationary and analytically tractable. Upon liquidation at exogenous stochastic
time , the manager receives nothing and investors collect AUM W.
While the manager runs the fund (i.e. before stochastic liquidation time , i.e. t < ),
9The HWM may be reset following poor fund performance. Sometimes, it is argued that resetting the
HWM helps to re-align the incentives between the manager and investors. To oset the potential increase in
incentive fees collected due to the reset of the HWM, the manager may reduce management fees by lowering
c.
10We leave the endogenous determination of initial W0 for future research. In reality, it is often dicult to
write fully specied state contingent contracts that describe capital injection and withdrawal by investors.
We assume that managers have discretion and their actions are not fully observable nor contractible. Hence,
leverage will become relevant. See Titman (2010) for more discussion on this point.
7the AUM Wt evolves as follows
dWt = tWt ((t)dt + dBt) + (1   t)rWtdt   Wtdt   cWtdt
 k [dHt   (g   )Htdt]   dJt ; t <  : (4)
The rst and second terms in (4) describe the change of AUM W from the manager's
investment strategies in its alpha-generating technology and the risk-free asset as in standard
portfolio choice problem (Merton (1971)). The third term  Wdt gives the continuous
payout rate to investors. The sum of these three terms gives the change of W in the absence
of fees. The fourth term represents the management fees to the manager in ow terms (e.g.
c = 2%). The fth term gives the incentive/performance fees when the AUM exceeds the
HWM (e.g. k = 20%).11 The process J in the last (sixth) term is a pure jump process which
describes this liquidation risk: The AUM W is set to zero with probability  per unit of
time when investors exogenously liquidate the fund.
Various value functions for investors and the manager. We next dene present
values for various streams of cash ows. For a given dynamic investment strategy , we
use M(W;H;) and N(W;H;) to denote the present values (PVs) of the management fees
and the incentive fees, respectively. Recall that the alpha-generating technology (1)-(2) is
already after the systematic risk adjustment. For example, when the market portfolio is the
only source of systematic risk (i.e. CAPM holds for investments with no alpha), (1) should
be interpreted as market-neutral excess return after factoring out the market risk premium.












 r(s t)k [dHs   (g   )Hsds]

; (6)
11The manager collects the incentive fees if and only if dHt > (g   )Htdt, which can only happen on the
boundary (Wt = Ht). However, after reaching the new HWM, the manager may not collect incentive fees if
the fund does not make prots.
8where the manager collects neither management nor incentive fees after stochastic liquidation
time .12 Let F(W;H;) denote the PV of total fees, which is given by
F(W;H;) = M(W;H;) + N(W;H;): (7)









Finally, the total PV of the fund V (W;H) is given by the sum of F(W;H) and E(W;H):
V (W;H;) = F(W;H;) + E(W;H;): (9)
The manager's optimization problem and investors' voluntary participation. The
manager chooses the optimal dynamic investment policy  to maximize the PV of total fees
F(W;H;) as follows
max
 F(W;H;) = max
 fM(W;H;) + N(W;H;)g; (10)
subject to the investors' participation condition to which we now turn.
Anticipating that the manager behaves in own interest, investors rationally demand that
the PV of their payos is at least higher than their time-0 investment W0 in the fund in order
to break even, risk-adjusted and time-value adjusted. At time 0, by denition, the fund's
HWM is set at H0 = W0. Given the manager's optimal dynamic investment strategy , we
thus require the investors' value E(W0;W0;) at time 0 to satisfy the following condition
E(W0;W0;)  W0 : (11)
Intuitively, how much surplus investors collect depends on their relative bargaining power
against the manager. In perfectly competitive markets where we assume that the skilled
manager collects all the surplus, the above participation constraint (11) holds with equaility.
In moments when investors may have certain bargaining power (such as in the nancial crisis
12We may allow the manager to start a new fund after paying certain start-up costs and extend the model
and analysis accordingly. In those extensions, the manager will maximize the PV of fees from the current
fund and the \continuation" value from managing future funds. This important extension will signicantly
complicate the analysis and lengthen the paper. We leave it for future research.
9periods where capital supply is potentially limited), their participation constraint may hold
with slack, i.e. earning some rents by providing valuable capital to the manager.
Before analyzing the general case where the manager receives both management and
incentive fees, we rst study the case where the manager only receives management fees.
3 First-best benchmark: management fees only
With only management fees and no high-powered incentive schemes (k = 0), there are
no conicts of interest between the manager and investors. This compensation contract
eectively gives the manager an equity stake in the fund and hence managerial incentives
are perfectly aligned with investors' incentives. The manager thus maximizes the fund's total
surplus, which is equivalent to maximizing managerial rents or investors' interest. Leverage
is valuable in the model because the manager trades o earning alpha on a larger pool of
assets and lowering alpha on the marginal unit of investment due to price pressure (i.e.
0() < 0).13 The following proposition summarizes the analytical results for the special
case with management fees only.





c +  +    W ; (12)
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c +  +    W : (15)





c +  + 
c +  +    W : (16)
13Wang and Wang (2010) use the proportional transaction cost setting in the well known portfolio choice
model of Davis and Norman (1990) and obtain essentially the same result as we do when the manager is
only paid via management fees. We view our results as complementary to theirs.
10Note that  can be interpreted as the level of the fund's optimally levered alpha. For
convergence, we need to ensure that levered alpha  cannot be too high, i.e.

 < c +  + ; (17)
where  is given by (13)-(14). With 0() = 0, the optimal leverage in the k = 0 benchmark
is innity, because the manager is risk neutral and there is no mechanism to discourage the
manager from taking on leverage. The negative price pressure (i.e. 0() < 0) is one natural
way to ensure convergence in our benchmark without incentive fees. As we will show later,
when investors have options to liquidate the fund following poor fund performances, we no
longer need to require 0() < 0 for the purpose of convergence. For the benchmark with
k = 0 with no frictions, we require 0() < 0 for convergence. Additionally, the inequality
(17) ensures that investment strategy is not too good to be true so that the value of the
alpha-generating technology (1) even after leverage is still nite.
Our model features managerial skills ( > 0 and hence  > 0). If the skilled manager
has all the bargaining power as in perfectly competitive markets, we expect that investors
break even, i.e. E(W) = W. Using (15), we obtain the equilibrium compensation contract
which features management fee c = . Intuitively, the manager charges c at the managerial
optimally levered skill premium . Consequently, using (12), we obtain that the equilibrium
value of management fees to be F (W) = W=( + ). Note that management fees are
collected each period as a fraction of AUM, the sum of the fees can be quite signicant as
the formula suggests and our calculation in Section 5 shows. In markets where capital is
scarce, more even distribution of bargaining power between the manager and investors may
exist. In that case, we naturally expect a more balanced distribution of the surplus between
investors and the manager.
An example for the alpha-generating strategy. Consider the following specication
() = 0   1 ; (18)
where 0 > 0 and 1  0 are constant. For the special case with 1 = 0, the un-levered
alpha is equal to 0, a constant implying no price pressure. In general, with 1 > 0, the
un-levered alpha () decreases with , i.e. the manager is concerned about the negative
impact of  on the un-levered alpha. The manager optimally chooses leverage to trade o
11more investments via leverage yielding excess returns against lowering alpha on the marginal
unit of investment due to higher  (i.e. price pressure). The equilibrium optimal leverage is









The manager has no conicts of interest with investors in the benchmark without incentive
fees and volatility has no inuence on leverage because the manager is risk neutral. In
Section 5, we will use the alpha strategy (18) to conduct our numerical analysis.
While our benchmark model is set up for the case with k = 0, it also applies to settings
where the high-water mark H approaches innity (H ! 1). For that case, the incentive
fees are eectively completely out of the money, and hence the manager de facto collects
only the management fees, and therefore, the solution is the same as the one given here.
We next turn to the general setting where the manager collects both management and in-
centive fees. The high-water mark plays a fundamental role in leverage choices and valuation,
resulting in imperfect alignment of incentives between the manager and investors.
4 Model solution: The general case with the HWM
We solve the manager's optimization problem using dynamic programming. First, we study
the manager's behavior and implied valuation when the AUM is below the HWM (i.e. W <
H). Second, we analyze the manager's behavior when the evolution of the AUM leads to
setting the new HWM. Third, we use the homogeneity property of our model to solve for
the manager's optimal investment strategy and various PVs for the manager and investors.
The manager's intertemporal decision problem when W < H. When the fund's
AUM is below its HWM (W < H), instantaneously the manager will not receive the incentive
fees. The fund is in the \interior" region where the option component (incentive fees) is
inactive over the short horizon, and the manager only collects management fees. However,
being forward looking, the manager chooses dynamic investment strategy  to maximize
F(W;H), the PV of total fees. Using the principle of optimality, we have the following
12Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation in the interior region
(r + )F(W;H) = max







2FWW(W;H) + (g   )HFH(W;H):
The left side of (20) elevates the discount rate from the interest rate r to (r + ) to reect
the stochastic liquidation of the fund. The rst term on the right side of (20) gives the
management fee: cW. The second and third terms give the drift (expected change) and
the volatility eects of the AUM W on F(W;H), respectively. Finally, the last term on the
right side of (20) describes the eect of the HWM H change on F(W;H). The manager
optimally chooses leverage  to equate the two sides of (20). Next, we analyze the properties
of F(W;H) when the AUM equals the HWM and moves along the boundary W = H.
The manager's intertemporal decision problem when W = H. Our reasoning for the
boundary behavior (W = H) essentially follows GIR and Panageas and Westereld (2009).
A positive return shock increases the AUM from W = H to H+H. The PV of total fees for
the manager is then given by F(H+H;H) before the HWM adjusts. Immediately after the
positive shock, the HMW adjusts to H + H. The manager then collects the incentive fees
in ow terms kH, and consequently the AUM is lowered from H+H to H+H kH.
The PV of total managerial fees is then equal to F(H + H   kH;H + H). Using the
continuity of F(; ) before and after the adjustment of the HWM, we have
F(H + H;H) = kH + F(H + H   kH;H + H): (21)
By taking the limit as H approaches zero and using Taylor's expansion rule, we obtain
kFW(H;H) = k + FH(H;H): (22)
The above is the value-matching condition for the manager on the boundary W = H. By
using essentially the same logic, we obtain the following boundary conditions for the PV of
management fees M(W;H) and the PV of incentive fees N(W;H) at the boundary W = H:
kMW(H;H) = MH(H;H) and kNW(H;H) = k + NH(H;H).
Finally, we turn to the left boundary condition. When the fund runs out of assets
(W = 0), there is no more AUM in the future and hence no fees: F(0;H) = 0: In Section 6,
13we extend our model to allow investors to have more control rights. For example, investors
may prevent the AUM from falling below a certain fraction of the HWM by being able
to contractually liquidate the fund. We show that this lower liquidation boundary has
signicant eects on the manager's dynamic investment strategies and valuation.
As we will show, our model captures dynamic leverage decisions in a tractable framework.
The tractability of our model solution critically rests on the homogeneity property. That is,
if we simultaneously double the AUM W and the HWM H, the PV of total fees F(W;H) will
accordingly double. The eective state variable is thus the ratio between the AUM W and the
HWM H: w = W=H. We will use the lower case to denote the corresponding variable in the
upper case scaled by the contemporaneous HWM H. For example, f(w) = F(W;H)=H. The
following theorem summarizes the main results on (w) and the PV of total fees F(W;H).
Theorem 1 The scaled PV of total fees f(w) solves the following ODE









where the optimal investment strategy (w) solves the following equation
(w) =
((w))
2 (w)   0((w))
; (24)
and  (w) is given by




The ODE (23) for f(w) is solved subject to the following boundary conditions
f(0) = 0; (26)
f(1) = (k + 1)f
0(1)   k: (27)
Equation (24) gives the manager's optimal dynamic investment strategy. While the man-
ager is risk neutral, incentive issues and other frictions generate curvatures for the managerial
value function f(w). The numerator in (24) gives the fund's optimally chosen levered alpha
((w)). The denominator has two components. First, the curvature of the manager's value
function f(w), i.e. the manager's eective risk attitude  (w) =  wf00(w)=f0(w), matters for
the portfolio choice (w) due to an \eective" risk attitude for the manager,  (w), which
14works in an interactive way with the variance of the return process, 2. Second, with market
pressure (i.e. 0() < 0), the manager chooses investment  by anticipating its diminish-
ing eect on total expected excess return (). Provided that the sum of the two terms is
positive, i.e. 2 (w)   0(w) > 0, the optimal portfolio rule (w) has an interior solution.
The formula (25) for  (w) measures the curvature of the manager's value function f(w),
and we may intuitively refer to  (w) as the manager's eective risk attitude. When f(w)
is convex (due to the optionality induced by the HWM), the risk-neutral manager behaves
eectively in a risk-loving manner. When f(w) is concave, the risk-neutral manager behaves
eectively in a risk-averse manner for precautionary reasons to mitigate investors' liquidation
likelihood. Whether the manager behaves in a risk-averse or risk-seeking manner depends
on various constraints and managerial incentives (See Sections 5 and 6 for details).
Finally, the ODE (23) is a Black-Merton-Scholes type of valuation equation adapted
for the manager's dynamic optimal leverage and management/incentive fees. Equation (26)
states that w = 0 is an absorbing boundary with f(0) = 0. Equation (27) gives the condition
at the upper boundary w = 1 when the manager is close to collecting incentive fees.
We now turn to the implied dynamic valuation for various components of the fund. We
summarize the main results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Given investment strategy (w), the dynamics of w = W=H is given by
dwt = w(wt)dt + (wt)wtdBt   dJt ; (28)
where J is a pure jump process which sets w = 0 upon the stochastic arrival of the jump with
intensity , and the drift function w(w) is given by
w(w) = [(w)((w)) + r   g   c]w: (29)
The value functions M(W;H), N(W;H), and E(W;H) are all homogeneous with degree one
in AUM W and HWM H, i.e. M(W;H) = m(w)H, N(W;H) = n(w)H, E(W;H) = e(w)H,
where m(w), n(w), e(w) solve the following ODEs respectively



























15with the following boundary conditions
m(0) = n(0) = e(0) = 0; (33)
m(1) = (k + 1)m
0(1); (34)
n(1) = (k + 1)n
0(1)   k; (35)
e(1) = (k + 1)e
0(1): (36)
The total fund's value is V (W;H) = v(w)H, where v(w) = m(w)+n(w)+e(w) = f(w)+e(w):
Investors' voluntary participation. In order for investors to voluntarily participate,
we need to ensure that investors do not lose money in present value by investing with the
manager, i.e. E(W0;W0)  W0 as given in (11). It is equivalent to require e(1)  1 due
to the homogeneity property of E(W;H). In our baseline model with perfectly competitive
capital markets, the manager collects all the rents from their managerial skills, and therefore,
we have the equilibrium outcome for the investors' value
e(1) = 1: (37)
In general, depending on the relative bargaining power between the manager and investors,
investors may collect some surpluses especially when capital supply is limited as in nancial
crisis periods. We now analyze the results for the general case with the HWM.
5 Results: Alpha, fees, leverage, and valuation
We rst choose the parameter values and then analyze the model's results.
Parameter choices. All rates are annualized and continuously compounded, whenever
applicable. For the baseline calculation, we set the interest rate r = 5%, the payout rate
to investors  = 5%, the annual liquidation probability  = 5%, and the target growth rate
of the HWM H g = 5% so that the net growth rate of the HWM H in the interior region
is zero in the absence of stochastic liquidation, i.e. g    = 0. That is, the HWM H is
the running maximum of the AUM W: Ht = maxfWs : s 2 [0;t]g: We specify the alpha
strategy: () = 0   1 as in (18) and choose 0 = 2:5%, 1 = 0:25%, and  = 9%.
165.1 The HWM H, leverage , and managerial rents f(w)
The benchmark with no incentive fees (k = 0). With the baseline parameter values,
the optimal leverage is time-invariant and is equal to  = 5. That is, for each dollar of the
AUM, the fund borrows four dollars and invests total ve dollars in the risky positive-alpha
generating technology delivering an optimally levered alpha for the fund:  = 6:25%. To
ensure that investors break even under perfectly competitive capital markets (e(1) = 1), we
need to set the equilibrium management fee to the value of the portfolio's levered alpha:
c =  = 6:25% using (15) so that the manager collects all the surplus. The managerial
rents are signicant in this example: 62.5% of the AUM, i.e. F (W) = 0:625W. Investors
always value his investments at AUM, i.e. E(W) = W. The dashed line in Figure 1 plots
the time-invariant optimal leverage  = 0=(21) = 5.
The eect of incentive fees (k > 0). We choose the 2-20 management contract: c = 2%
and k = 20%. As we will show later, with other parameter values, they imply e(1) = 1 so
that investors break even in PV and the manager collects all the surplus for skills.












Figure 1: Dynamic investment strategy (w). The solid line corresponds to the 2-20
compensation contract: c = 2% and k = 20%; and the dashed line corresponds to the benchmark
contract with no incentive fees: c = 6:25% and k = 0. Both contracts satisfy e(1) = 1. The other
parameter values are: r = 5%,  = 5%,  = 5%, g = 5%, 0 = 2:5%, 1 = 0:25%, and  = 9%.
17The solid line in Figure 1 plots (w) as a function of w for a typical 2-20 compensation
contract (c = 2% and k = 20%). Reducing management fees c from 6.25% to 2% to
accompany the introduction of incentive fees from k = 0 to k = 20% ensures that investors
break even at the moment of participation, i.e. e(1) = 1.
Compared with the k = 0 benchmark, the manager invests more in the positive-alpha
technology due to incentive fees: (w) >  = 5 for w > 0. Intuitively, the manager now
maximizes the sum of an \equity" like stake (management fees) and an \option" like stake
(incentive fees). The manager's overall position is thus more levered than investors' pure
equity stake. The call optionality embedded in incentive fees (k > 0) encourages excessive
managerial risk taking, the degree of which increases with w because the moneyness of
the incentive fees increases with w. In the limit as w ! 1, we obtain the maximal leverage
(1) = 6:33, which is about 27% higher than the no-incentive-fee benchmark leverage  = 5.
At the other end as w ! 0 , excessive risk taking disappears and optimal leverage (0)
converges to  = 5 because the call option is completely out of money.
The left panel of Figure 2 plots the PV of total fees f(w) under the 2-20 contract and
compares with f(w) for the k = 0 benchmark. Greater risk taking induced by incentive fees
lowers total managerial rents: f(w) < f(w). Note that this result follows from the following
two results: (i) the no-incentive fee (k = 0) benchmark yields the highest total value of the
fund v(1) and (ii) the management compensation contracts adjust so that e(1) = 1 under
both settings and hence the manager collects all the surpluses: f(1) = v(1)   1. In our
example, under the 2-20 contract, f(1) = 0:589, which is about 5.76% smaller than the
rst-best benchmark level f(1) = 0:625:
The right panel of Figure 2 plots the manager's risk attitude  (w) =  wf00(w)=f0(w),
which is dened in (25). In the benchmark with k = 0, we have  (w) = 0 for all w, i.e.
the manager is risk neutral. When k > 0, the risk-neutral manager takes on excessive risk.
Using the optimal leverage formula (24), we see that (w) >  because the manager is
eectively risk seeking (f(w) is convex and  (w) < 0). Moreover, as w increases, the call
option embedded in incentive fees becomes deeper in the money, the manager becomes more
risk seeking ( (w) < 0 and j (w)j increases with w), and therefore, leverage (w) increases
with w as we see in Figure 1.






























Figure 2: The PV of total fees f(w) and the \eective" risk attitude:  (w) =
 wf00(w)=f0(w). The manager's value f(w) is convex, indicating that there is excessive
managerial risk seeking ( (w) < 0) with incentive fees (k > 0) than without (k = 0).
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Figure 3: The sensitivities of the PV of total fees F(W;H) with respect to the
AUM W and the HWM H: FW(W;H) and FH(W;H).
19The marginal values of the AUM W and of the HWM H: FW(W;H) and FH(W;H).
Using the homogeneity property of the PV of total fees F(W;H), we have the following results
for the marginal values of the AUM W and of the HWM H on managerial rents F(W;H)
FW(W;H) = f
0(w); (38)
FH(W;H) = f(w)   wf
0(w): (39)
The solid line in the left panel of Figure 3 plots FW(W;H) = f0(w) for the case with incentive
fees (k > 0). For comparison purposes, the dashed horizontal line in the left panel of Figure
3 depicts the corresponding constant marginal value of the AUM for the k = 0 benchmark
at F 
W(W) = f
w(w) = 0:625 for all w, which implies that the managerial rents are equal to
62.5% of the AUM, a signicant amount. Unlike the k = 0 benchmark, the marginal value
of the AUM FW(W;H) = f0(w) is increasing in w, which implies that F(W;H) is convex in
the AUM W (i.e. f00(w) > 0) due to the call option feature embedded in incentive fees.
The marginal value of the AUM FW(W;H) varies signicantly with w. If w is suciently
high, the marginal value of the AUM FW(W;H) is high because of the high powered incentives
from the incentive fee structure. For example, FW(W;H) reaches $0.658 at w = 1: f0(1) =
0:658, which is above the horizontal line for the k = 0 benchmark. For suciently low w, the
marginal value of AUM FW can be quite low. For example, when w = 0 (say due to H ! 1),
the incentive fee is completely out of the money and FW(0;H) = f0(0) = c=(++c ) =
0:02=(0:05+0:05+0:02 0:0625) = 0:348, signicantly below the horizontal line (note that
c = 2% in the 2-20 contract compared with c = 6:25% in the k = 0 benchmark).
The right panel of Figure 3 plots FH(W;H), the marginal eect of the HWM H on
F(W;H). The HWM H is eectively the strike price of F(W;H), however, it is stochastic
and endogenous. Increasing the HWM H reduces the optionality and hence lowers the PV
of total fees F(W;H) giving rise to the intuitive result: FH(W;H) < 0,. See the negatively
valued FH(W;H) in the right panel of Figure 3. Because FHH(W;H) = w2f00(w)=H > 0
and f00(w) > 0 with k > 0, F(W;H) is thus convex in the HWM H, which is similar to the
result that option value is convex in the strike price.
5.2 Valuing various components for the manager and investors
PVs of incentive fees N(W;H) and management fees M(W;H). Figure 4 plots the
scaled PVs of incentive fees n(w) and management fees m(w). Not surprisingly, both n(w)
20and m(w) increase with w. For this numerical example, the PV of incentive fees at w = 1
is n(1) = 0:39, which is approximately twice as much as the PV of management fees:
m(1) = 0:20. Incentive fees matter much more than management fees in this example.
The total surplus F(W;W) is about 59% of the AUM W, ie. f(1) = 0:59, which is signi-
cant. When we allow investors to contractually liquidate the fund conditional on managerial
performances, we show that both absolute and relative quantitative signicance of incentive
and management fees fundamentally change.











value of incentive fees: n(w)
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Figure 4: Decomposing managerial rents f(w) into the PV of incentive fees n(w)
and the PV of management fees m(w): f(w) = n(w) + m(w).
The upper and lower left panels of Figure 5 plot NW(W;H) = n0(w) and MW(W;H) =
m0(w), respectively. First, n0(w) is increasing in w. That is, the value of incentive fees
N(W;H) is convex in the AUM W due to the embedded optionality of incentive fees.
Second, m0(w) is decreasing in w. That is, the value of management fees M(W;H)
is concave in the AUM W. Incentive fees crowd out management fees, and the payment
of incentive fees lowers the AUM. The substitution of incentive fees for management fees
eectively makes the value of management fees M(W;H) concave in W.14
14Of course, there is an overall risk-taking eect induced by the incentive fees, i.e. the value of total fees
F(W;H) is convex in W. The crowding-out eect is stronger than the overall risk-taking eect which makes
F(W;H) and N(W;H) convex in W but M(W;H) concave in W.
21We now turn to the eects of the HWM H on N(W;H) and M(W;H). Intuitively, the
higher the HWM H, the less likely the manager collects the incentive fees, which suggests
that the PV of incentive fees N(W;H) decreases with the HWM H: NH(W;H) < 0. Indeed,
the upper right panel in Figure 5 plots NH(W;H), which is negative for all w.
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Figure 5: Sensitivities of the PV of management fees M(W;H) and the PV of
incentive fees N(W;H) with respect to the AUM W and the HWM H: NW(W;H),
NH(W;H), MW(W;H), and MH(W;H).
The higher the HWM H, the less likely the manager gets paid via the incentive fees,
which implies a higher AUM for a given dynamic investment strategy and hence a larger PV
of management fees M(W;H), i.e. MH(W;H) > 0. The lower right panel in Figure 5 plots
MH(W;H), which is indeed positive for all w.
It is worth pointing out the dierences between our model and Panageas and Westereld
22(2009). In their model, the manager is only compensated with incentive fees and is more
patient than investors.15 The main dierences are as follows. First, our model predicts
that the PV of incentive fees N(W;H) is convex in the AUM W while N(W;H) is concave
in the AUM W in Panageas and Westereld (2009). Second, our model predicts that the
PV of incentive fees N(W;H) decreases with the HWM H. Third, our model predicts that
ceteris paribus N(W;H) increases with the incentive fee parameter k. These predictions are
opposite of those given by Panageas and Westereld (2009). In their model, the manager
prefers keeping money inside the fund due to the fund's alpha-generating technology and
managerial patience. Increasing the HWM keeps the manager's future fees inside the fund
longer, which allows the manager to generate more expected excess returns by building up
the AUM. As a result, the PV of incentive fees N(W;H) increases with the HWM H. The
mechanism in our model fundamentally diers from theirs.
Investors' value E(W;H) and the total value of the fund V (W;H). The upper row of
Figure 6 plots scaled investors' value e(w), EW(W;H) and EH(W;H). The scaled investors'
value e(w) is increasing and concave in w because investors are short in the incentive fee
induced call option, whose value is convex in the AUM W. The mid-panel shows that
EW(W;H) is decreasing and hence implies a concave E(W;H) in W. The right panel shows
that the higher the HWM H, the less valuable the incentive fees and as a result, the higher the
investors' value EH(W;H) > 0. The lower row of Figure 6 plots the scaled total fund value
v(w), VW(W;H), and VH(W;H). While investors' value e(w) is concave and the manager's
value f(w) is convex, the sum of the two, v(w) = f(w) + e(w), is concave. The net eect of
paying the manager incentive fees encourages excessive risk taking which in turn lowers the
total fund value. Therefore, the total fund is short of a risk-seeking option ex post and hence
its ex ante value is concave in the AUM W. Finally, the total fund value V (W;H) increases
with the HWM H because the gain to investors from a higher H (an increase in E(W;H))
outweighs the corresponding loss to the manager (decreases in N(W;H) and F(W;H)).
15There is no payout from the fund to investors other than exogenous liquidation of the fund which




























































Figure 6: The scaled investors' value e(w), the scaled total fund value v(w), and
sensitivities of investors' value E(W;H) and the total fund value V (W;H) with
respect to the AUM W and the HWM H.
6 Extensions: Liquidation and managerial ownership
In order to focus on economic intuition, we have so far intentionally kept our baseline model
parsimonious. However, there are two important features that we often observe in the real
world hedge fund contracts that are missing in the baseline model. One key simplication in
the baseline model is that the fund has no performance-triggered withdrawal. In our baseline
model, the manager still manages the fund even after losing 99% of the AUM from the peak
performance. In reality, when the fund performance deteriorates suciently (for example, if
the fund loses 50% or more of its AUM from its running maximum, i.e. the HWM), investors
are likely to withdraw from and sometimes even liquidate the fund.
We will show that investors' option to liquidate or withdraw from the fund signicantly
24changes managerial leverage and also has important quantitative implications on the valua-
tion of fees. We model liquidation by allowing investors to liquidate the fund if the manager
performs suciently poorly. Specically, we assume that the fund is liquidated whenever
the AUM W falls by a xed fraction (1   b) from the fund's HWM H, i.e. the fund's run-
ning maximum/best record in the simple example. GIR makes the same assumption on the
liquidation boundary but the AUM evolution in their paper is exogenously given.
The manager is now potentially averse to performance-linked withdrawal/liquidation be-
cause the manager loses both management and incentive fees if the fund is liquidated.16 The
manager rationally manages the fund's leverage to inuence the AUM evolution and hence
the liquidation likelihood. As we will show, the manager will signicantly delever the fund
when it is suciently close to the liquidation boundary in order to preserve the fund as a
going-conern and collect future management and incentive fees.
One way to mitigate managerial agency is to require managers to have their own skins in
the game. In equilibrium, rational investors take into account managerial ownership in the
fund when making investment decisions. We next extend our baseline model of Section 2 to
incorporate both performance-based liquidation and managerial ownership.
6.1 A generalized setup and solution
Let  denote the managerial ownership in the fund. For simplicity, we assume that  is
constant over time. Let Q(W;H) denote the manager's total value, which includes both the
value of total fees F(W;H) and E(W;H), the manager's share as an investor
Q(W;H) = F(W;H) + E(W;H): (40)
The manager dynamically chooses the investment policy (w) to maximize (40). The follow-
ing theorem gives the optimal (w) and the scaled manager's total value q(w) = f(w)+e(w).
Theorem 2 The manager's scaled total value q(w) solves the following ODE









where w(w) is given by (29). The ODE (41) is solved subject to the boundary conditions
q(b) = b; (42)
q(1) = (k + 1)q
0(1)   k: (43)
16See Dai and Sundaresan (2010) on this point in a model without the high-water mark and incentive fees.
25With the alpha-generating technology (18), the optimal investment strategy (w) is given by
(w) =

1 + 2 q(w)=(21)
; (44)
where  = 0=(21) is the rst-best leverage ratio and  q(w) is the manager's eective risk
aversion dened by




There are two key dierences between Theorem 2 and Theorem 1: concentrated managerial
ownership  in the fund and the lower liquidation boundary b. The cash ow to the manager
(prior to liquidation) in the region b  w < 1 is given by (c + )w. With probability  per
unit of time, the fund is exogenously liquidated. Therefore, the expected cash ow per unit of
time (including exogenous liquidation risk) is (c+(+))w. When the fund's performance
is suciently poor, reaching the lower liquidation boundary b, the manager loses all fees but
collects pro rata share of the liquidating AUM: q(b) = b.
Requiring the risk-neutral manager to have skin in the game via equity ownership im-
proves the alignment between managerial and investors' interests. As in the baseline model,
the manager's optimal investment strategy (w) depends on the manager's eective risk
attitude. When calculating the manager's eective risk aversion  q(w), we need to use the
manager's total value q(w), which includes both managerial pro rata share of the fund e(w)
and the PV of total fees f(w). The next proposition summarizes the eects of a liquidation
boundary and managerial ownership on dynamic valuation.
Proposition 3 The scaled value functions m(w), n(w), and e(w) solve (30), (31), and (32),
subject to the following lower boundary conditions
m(b) = n(b) = 0; e(b) = b: (46)
The upper boundary conditions at w = 1 remain the same as in Proposition 2, i.e. conditions
(34), (35), and (36), respectively. The total fund's value is V (W;H) = v(w)H, where
v(w) = m(w)+n(w)+e(w) = f(w)+e(w). The manager's scale value is q(w) = f(w)+e(w).
266.2 Performance-triggered liquidation
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Figure 7: Dynamic investment strategy (w): The case with liquidation boundary
b = 0:5 and no managerial ownership ( = 0). The managerial compensation contract
(c;k) is set at (2:48%;20%) to ensure that investors break even: e(1) = 1. Other parameter
values are: r = 5%,  = 5%,  = 5%, g = 5%, 0 = 2:5%, 1 = 0:25%, and  = 9%.
Dynamic investment strategy (w) under a liquidation boundary b > 0. Figure 7
plots the manager's optimal leverage (w) when the liquidation boundary is set at b = 0:5
and no managerial ownership ( = 0). A new equilibrium compensation contract which
ensures e(1) = 1, i.e. investors break even, is given by c = 2:48% and k = 20%. All other
parameter values remain unchanged.
Recall that in our baseline model (with c = 2% and k = 20%) and no liquidation
boundary (b = 0), leverage is between 5 and 6.33 (See Figure 1). With the liquidation
boundary (b = 0:5), the overall leverage is much lower due to the manager's aversion to
liquidation. For suciently high w (i.e. w  0:6), the manager takes on leverage ( > 1).
However, the leverage level is much lower with liquidation boundary b = 0:5 than without
(b = 0). For example, at w = 1, leverage is (1) = 2:91 when b = 0:5 compared to
(1) = 6:33 when b = 0.
When w is suciently close to the liquidation boundary b = 0:5 (i.e. 0:5 < w < 0:6),
ghting for survival is the manager's primary concern. The manager rationally allocates
27some of the fund's AUM to the risk-free asset ((w) < 1) by hoarding cash in order to lower
the volatility of the AUM return even though the risky investment strategy has a positive
alpha. That is, unlike the case without liquidation (b = 0), the optimal investment strategy
(w) can sometimes be less than unity. The manager is not only long an incentive-fees-
induced call option but also short a liquidation option. This liquidation option is closer to
being in the money following suciently poor performance, i.e. w drifts leftward toward
the liquidation boundary b = 0:5. The short position in the liquidation option induces the
manager to behave in an eectively risk averse manner and hence de-leveraging is often
optimal. Casual observations seem consistent with this prediction. Fund managers tend to
reduce leverage in bad times following poor performances.
Liquidation is costly because the manager loses future rents from the alpha generating
technology.17 By reducing exposure to the risky positive alpha technology, the manager
gives up some current and near-term fees in exchange for increasing their long term survival
probability. Dai and Sundaresan (2010) also show that hedge funds may use conservative
levels of leverage if they properly recognize the short option positions due to contractual
arrangements with investors and prime brokers.
Managerial rents f(w) and risk attitude  (w). The left panel of Figure 8 plots f(w)
when the liquidation boundary is set at b = 0:5. Compared with the case of b = 0, the PV
of total fees f(w) is substantially lower. Liquidation shortens the duration of the fund's life
and also reduces the manager's incentive to take on risk, both of which lower f(w). With
b = 0:5, the manager makes a rent of 29:6 cents for each dollar in AUM f(1) = 0:296,
which is substantially lower than a rent of 58:9 cents per dollar of AUM f(1) = 0:589 when
b = 0. Note that this comparison has already accounted for the adjustment of managerial
compensation from c = 2% for b = 0 to c = 2:48% for b = 0:5 while keeping k = 20% so that
investors break even under perfectly competitive capital markets, e(1) = 1.
The right panel of Figure 8 plots the manager's eective risk aversion  (w) for the
case with b = 0:5. The lower liquidation boundary turns the risk-neutral manager from
behaving in a risk-seeking way ( (w) < 0 for b = 0) to behaving in an eectively risk-averse
way ( (w) > 0 when b = 0:5). The manager's \eective" risk aversion at the liquidation
17We do not consider the manager's option to start a new fund. While costly, it is potentially an important
consideration for the manager. We leave the modeling for future research.
28boundary b = 0:5 is  (0:5) = 4:91, which is quantitatively signicant. Even when incentive
fees are close to being in the money (when w = 1), the manager continues to behave in an
eectively risk-averse manner with an eective risk aversion:  (1) = 0:45 > 0.
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Figure 8: Managerial rents f(w) and the manager's eective risk aversion,  (w) =
 wf00(w)=f0(w): The case with liquidation boundary b = 0:5 and no managerial
ownership ( = 0). Increasing the liquidation boundary from b = 0 to b = 0:5 substantially
lowers the PV of total fees f(w) and makes the manager eectively risk averse ( (w) > 0).
Our results challenge the conventional wisdom that high-powered incentive fees often
encourage excessive risk taking. In isolation, the high-powered incentives encourage excessive
risk taking as we have shown in the baseline model with b = 0. However, other frictions, such
as the liquidation option held by investors, fundamentally change the managerial incentive
to take on leverage. Indeed, the manager sometimes behaves too conservatively from the
investors' perspective. Compared with the rst-best leverage  = 5, the fund is under-
levered for all w when b = 0:5. This provides one explanation why sometimes we see that
investors require a lower bound for the fund's leverage. Managers may sometimes choose
excessively low leverage primarily for survival and fee collection. Next, we characterize
various value functions and provide some quantitative results from this numerical example.
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Figure 9: The value of incentive fees n(w), the value of management fees m(w), in-
vestors' value e(w), and the total fund value v(w): The case with lower liquidation
boundary b = 0:5.
Various value functions: n(w), m(w), e(w), and v(w). Figure 9 plots the PV of incen-
tive fees n(w), the PV of management fees m(w), investors' value e(w), and the total fund
value v(w) for the case with b = 0:5 and no managerial ownership ( = 0). Intuitively, we
nd the PV of management fees m(w) is increasing and concave, and the PV of incentive
fees n(w) is increasing and convex. These results are consistent with those in Section 5 for
the baseline model with b = 0.
Quantitatively, the liquidation option signicantly changes the economics of managerial
fees and valuation. For the baseline model with b = 0, in our numerical example, the PV of
incentive fees n(1) = 0:39, which is approximately twice as much as the PV of management
fees m(1) = 0:2. Increasing b = 0 to b = 0:5, the value of incentive fees drops to n(1) = 0:1
30which is about half of the value of management fees m(1) = 0:2. Therefore, increasing
the liquidation boundary from b = 0 to b = 0:5 not only lowers the PV of total fees from
f(1) = 0:39+0:2 = 0:59 to f(1) = 0:1+0:2 = 0:3 by about half, it also changes the relative
weights of incentive fees to management fees from 2:1 to 1:2. With liquidation boundary
b = 0:5, the manager acts much more conservatively with leverage and management fees
become the larger portion of the total fees.
Unlike in the baseline model with b = 0, the investors' value e(w) is no longer globally
concave. It is convex in w for suciently low w (0:5  w  0:617) and concave in w
for suciently high w (0:617  w  1). The intuition is as follows. For any given w, the
investors are simultaneously short in the incentive call option and long the liquidation option,
in addition to the unlevered \equity" claim in the fund's after-fees cash ow process. For
lower values of w, the long position of the liquidation option is quantitatively more important
than the short position of the incentive option. The net eect is that e(w) is convex in w
for low values of w. For higher values of w, the opposite holds and hence the net eect
is that e(w) is concave in w at the right end of w. The high non-linearity of e(w) reects
various option features embedded in the hedge fund management compensation contracts.
The lower left panel of Figure 9 depicts e(w) which is convex in w for 0:5  w  0:617
and concave in w for 0:617  w  1. Finally, the total fund's value v(w) is increasing and
concave. The concavity follows from the net eects of total fees and investors' value.
To summarize, the liquidation boundary makes the manager's investment strategy much
more conservative because preserving the fund as a going-concern is valuable for the manager.
Management fees carry more weight when the liquidation option becomes more valuable for
investors. Liquidation boundary can signicantly lower the value of total fees by truncat-
ing the fund's horizon and also substantially lowering the managerial incentive to take on
leverage. We next analyze the eects of managerial ownership.
6.3 Managerial ownership and liquidation threshold
Table 1 reports the investment strategy (1), the PV of management fees m(1), the PV of
incentive fees n(1), the PV of total fees f(1), the investor's payo e(1), and the total value
of the fund v(1) under various levels of managerial ownership  and liquidation boundaries
31Table 1: The eects of managerial ownership and the liquidation boundary on
fees, leverage, and valuation at w = 1.
This table reports the investment strategy (1), the PV of the management fees m(1), the PV
of incentive fees n(1), the PV of total fees f(1), the investor's payo e(1) and the total value
of the fund v(1) under various levels of managerial ownership  and liquidation boundaries
b. The compensation contract is xed at c = 2:61% and k = 20%. Other parameter values
are: r = 5%,  = 5%,  = 5%, g = 5%, 0 = 2:5%, 1 = 0:25%, and  = 9%.
(1) m(1) n(1) f(1) e(1) v(1)
Managerial ownership  Panel A. Liquidation boundary b = 0:5
0 2.8381 0.2055 0.0947 0.3002 0.9906 1.2908
0:05 2.7646 0.2046 0.0955 0.3001 0.9958 1.2958
0:10 2.7069 0.2035 0.0963 0.2998 1.0000 1.2998
0:25 2.5921 0.2002 0.0981 0.2983 1.0090 1.3072
0:50 2.4971 0.1953 0.1002 0.2956 1.0165 1.3121
Liquidation boundary b Panel B. Managerial ownership  = 0:1
0 5.7732 0.2642 0.3452 0.6095 1.0116 1.6210
0:25 4.7106 0.2407 0.2262 0.4669 1.0504 1.5173
0:50 2.7069 0.2035 0.0963 0.2998 1.0000 1.2998
0:75 0.3044 0.1742 0.0083 0.1826 0.9071 1.0897
b. The managerial compensation contract is xed at c = 2:61% and k = 20% for all cases.18
Other parameters are the same as in Section 5.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the results at w = 1 (e.g. when the fund is started) for
various levels of managerial ownership  with b = 0:5. Recall that when  = 10%, investors
break even (i.e. e(1) = 1) under the given compensation contract c = 2:61% and k = 20%.
The third row highlighted in bold summarizes the results for this base case: the optimal
leverage (1) = 2:7, the PV of total fees is about 30% of the AUM, i.e. f(1) = 0:3, out of
which management fees and incentive fees account for two-thirds and one-third, respectively:
m(1) = 0:2 and n(1) = 0:1.
As we increase managerial ownership  from 0 to 50%, leverage (w) falls from 2.8 to
18We use the condition that capital markets are perfectly competitive and investors break even (i.e. e(1) =
1) for the case with liquidation boundary b = 0:5 and managerial ownership  = 0:1 to pin down the
management fee at c = 2:61%. We set k = 20% for this calculation.
322.5.19 The more concentrated the managerial ownership , the less the fund will be levered.
The value of incentive fees n(1) thus also falls with ownership , but the value of management
fees m(1), the value of investors' payo e(1), and the total value of the fund v(1) all increase.
Next, we turn to the impact of liquidation boundary b. Panel B of Table 1 reports the
results for various levels of b with  = 0:1. As we increase the liquidation boundary b from
0 to 0.5, the manager signicantly decreases leverage (1) from 5:77 to 2:71. The PV of
total fees f(1), the PV of incentive fees n(1), and the PV of management fees m(1) all
decrease with the liquidation boundary b because liquidation shortens the fund's horizon
and discourages leverage. Comparing the case of b = 0 with that of b = 0:5, the PV of total
fees f(1) drops by about half from 0.61 to 0.30, while the PV of incentive fees n(1) drops
from 0.35 to 0.1 by more than 70% and the PV of management fees m(1) decreases from
0.26 to 0.20 by 23%. The relative weights of management and incentive fees also signicantly
change with the liquidation boundary b. For example, while incentive fees account for 57%
of f(1) with b = 0, incentive fees only account for less than 33% of f(1) with b = 0:50.
With suciently high liquidation risk (e.g. b = 0:75), the manager optimally places a
signicant fraction of the AUM, about 70%, in cash to earn the risk-free rate: (1) = 0:3. The
manager's strong desire for the fund's survival dominates the dynamic investment decision.
As a result, the total fund's value v(1) is signicantly lower, only about 1.09, which implies
that the fund is about 9 percent more valuable than its AUM W. For the manager, the PV of
total fees f(1) = 0:18, out of which the vast majority is from management fees: m(1) = 0:17
leaving only the value of incentive fees being n(1) = 0:01.
The preceding analyses x the managerial compensation contract at c = 2:61% and
k = 20%, keep all other parameter values unchanged, and focus on the comparative eects
of managerial ownership  and liquidation boundary b on leverage and valuation. However,
it is important to note that the surplus created from more concentrated managerial owner-
ship and/or better incentive alignments is not going to be captured by investors but rather
by the manager under perfectly competitive capital markets, e(1) = 1. In this case, the
compensation contract will adjust to reect the equilibrium outcome where the manager
collects all the surplus.20
19Note that in this exercise, as we vary managerial ownership , we no longer impose the restriction that
e(1) = 1. We are focusing on the impact of managerial ownership  and later liquidation boundary b on
leverage and valuation for a given xed compensation contract.
20Due to space constraints, we leave out the details of the analysis when we adjust the equilibrium com-
336.4 A special case: Constant un-levered alpha (1 = 0)





























the manager s total value: q(w)
Figure 10: Dynamic leverage (w) and the the manager's total value q(w) = f(w)+
e(w) with and without price pressure: 1 = 0:25%;0.
Throughout the paper, we have mainly considered the cases where  lowers the expected
excess returns in the un-levered alpha strategy (0() < 0 and 1 > 0 for the alpha-generating
strategy (18)). In Section 3, we have noted that for the benchmark with management fees
only, () < 0 is necessary to ensure convergence because the manager is risk neutral and
there are no other constraints on managerial decision making.
However, for the general case where investors can liquidate the fund (b > 0), the con-
vergence condition also holds even when 0() = 0, say under a constant alpha generating
strategy: () = 0. Figure 10 plots dynamic leverage (w) and the manager's total value
q(w) = f(w)+e(w), including both the PV of fees and pro rata share of fund equity, for two
levels of 1: 0.25% and 0. The former is the case analyzed earlier and the latter corresponds
to the case with a constant unlevered alpha 0 = 2:5%. Without negative price pressure
(1 = 0), leverage (w) is higher and the manager's value q(w) is also higher.
pensation contract. The details are available upon request.
347 The value of dynamically adjusting leverage
Leverage in our model creates value because the manager has skills and there is an optimal
scale of investments. We can decompose the PV of managerial rents f(w) and the total
fund value v(w) into an unlevered component and the net increase in value due to the use of
leverage. First, we summarize the results in the benchmark case where the manager takes
no leverage, i.e. a pure valuation model as in GIR.
7.1 A pure valuation model ((w) = 1): GIR
GIR incorporates the eects of the HWM on the valuation of management fees and incentive
fees. But their model does not allow for managerial leverage decisions. Their model can thus
be viewed as a special case of ours with (w) xed at unity for all w. The following theorem
summarizes the main results in GIR.
Theorem 3 Fixing (w) = 1 at all times and for all w, we have the following closed-form
solutions for various value functions
ngir(w) =
k(w   b w)




c +  +    (1)
w +
( +    (1))k + ((1 + k)   1)cb1 




b ( +    (1))k + ((1 + k)   1)cb1 





c +  +    (1)
w  
( + )k + ((1 + k)   1)(c   (1))b1 




b ( + )k + ((1 + k)   1)(c   (1))b1 
(c +  +    (1))((k + 1)   1   b ((1 + k)   1))
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 : (49)
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2(r +    g + )
2 < 0: (51)
In addition, we have mgir(w) = fgir(w)   ngir(w) and vgir(w) = egir(w) + fgir(w).
35Table 2: The value of leverage for various levels of managerial ownership  and
liquidation boundaries b at w = 1.
This table reports the PV of total fees fgir(1) and the total fund value vgir(1) in the GIR
benchmark and then quanties the NPV of leverage by calculating f(1) = f(1)   fgir(1)
and v(1) = v(1)   vgir(1) for various levels of managerial ownership  and liquidation
boundaries b. The managerial compensation contract is xed at c = 2:61% and k = 20%
for all cases. Other parameter values are: r = 5%,  = 5%,  = 5%, g = 5%, 0 = 2:5%,
1 = 0:25%, and  = 9%.
Panel A. Liquidation boundary b = 0:5
Managerial ownership GIR Benchmark NPV of Leverage
 fgir(1) vgir(1) f(1) v(1)
0 0.1459 0.8580 0.1543 0.4328
0:05 0.1459 0.8580 0.1542 0.4378
0:10 0.1459 0.8580 0.1539 0.4418
0:25 0.1459 0.8580 0.1524 0.4492
0:50 0.1459 0.8580 0.1497 0.4541
Panel B. Managerial ownership  = 0:1
Liquidation boundary GIR Benchmark NPV of Leverage
b fgir(1) vgir(1) f(1) v(1)
0 0.1792 0.8230 0.4303 0.7981
0:25 0.1735 0.8289 0.2934 0.6884
0:50 0.1459 0.8580 0.1539 0.4418
0:75 0.0850 0.9220 0.0976 0.1677
In our model, the manager creates value in two ways: the alpha-generating technology
and the use of leverage. Note that M&M does not hold in our model. Using the GIR as the
benchmark, we can quantify the value purely due to leverage.
7.2 The value of leverage
Let f(w) = f(w)   fgir(w) denote the dierence between the PV of total fees f(w) in our
model and fgir(w), the PV of total fees in GIR. Similarly, let v(w) = v(w) vgir(w) denote
the dierence between the PV of total fund's value v(w) in our model and vgir(w), the PV
36of total fund's value in GIR. Table 2 is based on the same set of calculations as Table 1.
Panel A of Table 2 calculates the net present value (NPV) of leverage for various levels
of ownership  with the liquidation boundary xed at b = 0:5. First, by construction, fgir(1)
and vgir(1) in the GIR benchmark are independent of managerial ownership , fgir(1) = 0:15
and vgir(1) = 0:86 for all . Second, incentive alignments between the manager and investors
improve with managerial ownership . As a result, the net gain due to leverage for the total
fund value, v(1), increases with ownership . However, the net gain due to leverage for
the value of total fees, f(1), decreases.
Panel B of Table 2 calculates the NPV of leverage for various levels of liquidation bound-
ary b with managerial ownership xed at  = 0:1. For the GIR benchmark, fgir(1) decreases
with liquidation boundary b. The manager becomes much more prudent in choosing leverage
due to concerns of losing future fees, and as a result, the NPV of leverage for the manager
f(1) drops signicantly from 0.43 to 0.098 when the liquidation boundary b increases from
0 to 0.75. Similarly, the added value from leverage for the total fund, v(1), also decreases
signicantly, from 0.80 to 0.17 as we increase b from 0 to 0.75.
8 Conclusions
Hedge fund managers are paid via both management fees and high-powered incentive fees.
Management fees are often specied as a fraction of the assets under management (AUM),
and incentive fees are indexed to the stochastic and endogenously evolving high-water mark
(HWM), which is eectively the running maximum of the AUM. While this compensation
structure potentially rewards managerial talent, it also invites agency conicts between the
manager and investors. Incentive fees provide the manager a sequence of call options on the
AUM and hence encourage the manager to take on excessive risk. However, management
fees provide an unlevered equity-like nancial claim in the fund and thus mitigate the man-
agerial risk seeking induced by incentive fees. The manager dynamically manages leverage
to maximize the present value of total fees, and investors rationally anticipate dynamically
changing managerial incentives and accordingly price their investments in the fund.
The two key state variables in our model are the AUM and the HWM. In our homogenous
framework, the ratio between the AUM and the HWM, w, determines the fund's dynamic
leverage decisions and various value functions including those for management and incentive
37fees. As the fund's performance improves, i.e. as w increases, the manager increases leverage
as incentive fees become deeper in the money. When the performance deteriorates, i.e. as w
decreases, the manager reduces leverage as management fees become more important, ceteris
paribus. This performance-dependent dynamic leverage strategy has important implications
on valuing management fees and incentive fees. While both management fees and incentive
fees contribute signicantly to managerial compensation in general, they carry dierent
weights in contributing to total managerial rents under dierent circumstances.
In our model, leverage contributes signicantly to the present value of managerial rents
and the total fund value because leverage allows the manager to capitalize on skills using a
larger pool of capital in a non-M&M world. Granting investors options to liquidate the fund
substantially curtails the manager's risk-taking incentives, eectively making the manager
behave in a risk-averse manner. Having the manager co-invest in the fund as a limited
partner also helps to align incentives and reduce agency conicts.
In reality, managerial skills may be unknown and time-varying. Extending the model
to allow investors to learn about time-varying unknown managerial skills is left for future
research. Additionally, the recent crisis reveals that market liquidity and funding liquidity are
rst-order issues (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)), and that funding costs can increase
signicantly in crisis periods. Anticipating these liquidity problems, the manager rationally
chooses the fund's leverage and prudently manages risk in a state contingent way (Dai and
Sundaresan (2010)). In future work, we plan to integrate market and funding illiquidity.
In order to make dynamic leverage and valuation results practical and operational, we
have taken real-world hedge fund management compensation contracts as given and focus on
the space of compensation contracts which feature management and incentive fees. Within
the set of contracts featuring management and incentive fees, we are able to provide a direct
link from managerial skills to managerial compensation contracts. For example, our model
predicts that a more talented manager charges more. James Simons' Renaissance charges
a management fee at 5% of the AUM and an incentive fee at 36%, while the industry
standard charges management and incentive fees at 2% and 20%, respectively. An interesting
direction for future research is to developing an industry equilibrium model of hedge funds
with heterogenous managerial skills. We expect that in equilibrium, managers with better
skills run larger funds and potentially charge higher fees.
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Proposition 1. Without incentive fees, the manager chooses optimal investment  to
maximize his value F (W) by solving the following HJB equation:
(r + )F
(W) = max











With no incentive fees, we can conjecture that F (W) = zW; where z is a constant to be





) = 0; (A.2)





c +  +    W ; (A.3)
where  is given in (13). We then obtain explicit linear value functions for E(W) and
V (W) given in Proposition 1.





W (W;H)   0()
: (A.4)
We have also veried the second-order condition. We conjecture that the value function
F(W;H) takes the following homogeneous form in W and H
F(W;H) = f(w)H : (A.5)
The above conjecture implies the following results: FW(W;H) = f0(w); FWW(W;H) =
f00(w)=H ; and FH(W;H) = f(w)   wf0(w): Substituting (A.4) into the HJB equation (20)
and boundary conditions (22), we obtain (23)-(27) in Theorem 1.












= w(w)dt + (wt)wtdBt   dJt ; (A.6)
where w(w) is given in (29). Applying the standard dierential equation pricing methodol-
ogy to the present values M(W;H) given in (5), N(W;H) given in (6), and E(W;H) given
in (8), we obtain (30), (31), and (32) for m(w), n(w), and e(w), respectively.
Now consider the boundary behavior at Wt = Ht. We use the same argument as the
one for F(W;H). Consider the scenario where the asset value increases by H over a small
time interval t, the high-water mark is then re-set to H + H. Because value functions
are continuous, we thus have
M(H + H;H) = M(H + H   kH;H + H); (A.7)
N(H + H;H) = kH + N(H + H   kH;H + H); (A.8)
E(H + H;H) = E(H + H   kH;H + H): (A.9)
Therefore, by taking limits, we have
kMW = MH ; kNW = k + NH; kEW = EH : (A.10)
Similarly, using the property that value functions are homogeneous with degree one in W and
H, we may write M(W;H) = m(w)H, N(W;H) = n(w)H, and E(W;H) = e(w)H : Finally,
W = 0 is an absorbing state and therefore M(0;H) = N(0;H) = E(0;H) = 0: Substituting
these results into valuation equations, we obtain results reported in Proposition 2.
Theorem 3. GIR is a special case of our model where the investment strategy xed at
(w) = 1 for all w. Using our earlier results, we calculate f(w) as follows





where (1) = 0   1. The linear ODE (A.11) has the following closed-form solution
f(w) = xw + y1w
 + y2w
 ; (A.12)
42where x, y1, and y2 are constant coecients which we will determine next, and  and  are
given by (50) and (51), respectively. Note that  and  are the positive and negative roots
of the following quadratic equation, respectively
(r +    g + ) = ((1) + r   g   c)z +
2
2
z(z   1): (A.13)
To ensure convergence, we require c +  +    (1) > 0, i.e. equivalently  > 1. Using
the boundary conditions f(b) = 0 and f(1) = (k + 1)f0(1)   k, we obtain
x =
c
c +  +    (1)
; (A.14)
y1 =
( +    (1))k + ((1 + k)   1)cb1 
(c +  +    (1))((k + 1)   1   b ((1 + k)   1))
; (A.15)
y2 =  
b ( +    (1))k + ((1 + k)   1)cb1 
(c +  +    (1))((k + 1)   1   b ((1 + k)   1))
: (A.16)
Closed-form expressions for other value functions can be similarly derived.
43